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Introduction
Since the birth of the nation state, we have been undergoing a process called
globalization. Simply put, globalization is the process of interaction and integration among the
people, companies and governments of different nations. It is a process driven by trade and
investment and supported by economic partnerships and institutions. Packed into this neat
definition, globalization seems fairly straightforward. However, this is anything but the case.
Because globalization involves interactions and flows of people, goods, ideas, and services at all
levels transnationally, it is inherently a very complicated and at times poorly understood process.
Although globalization has been occurring for hundreds of years, it is still quite difficult for
scholars to concretely explain and anticipate the effects globalization has had and will have on
states and individuals. This is largely because, as time goes on, the extent to which the world is
experiencing globalization continues to grow. Some argue that we have entered a period of
hyper-globalization with states becoming interconnected at unprecedented levels. It is for this
reason that it is often difficult to identify concrete trends within globalization.
Despite the mystery surrounding it, globalization has come to be a dominant feature in
our modern world, with international-level policies having very real ramifications for the
everyday individual. Recently, Donald Trump’s trade war with China has had unfortunate
implications for many American farmers who have been hit hard by China’s imposition of tariffs
on some U.S. products like soybeans in retaliation to Trump’s policies. The cost of the food and
goods we consume, the history we are taught in schools, and even the jobs that are available to us
are all subject to the force we know as globalization. Because globalization has implications on
both the transnational and individual levels, it is important that we attempt to understand it in
order to anticipate its consequences and provide more security for the individual. As we are more
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able to anticipate consequences, we will likely see less of a backlash against globalization as
states are more equipped to compensate the losers of globalization. This is an important pursuit
as the losers of globalization often mobilize in ways that can significantly alter the international
order. I will go into this in further detail later in this paper.
This paper will attempt to explore the implications that globalization has for the level of
democracy present within a state. As mentioned before, with globalization comes not only the
movement and flow of people, goods, and services, but also the movement of ideas. As
globalization occurs, individuals from different states come into contact with one another and
begin to facilitate the spread of ideas transnationally. What this implies is that globalization can
help to promote the spread of different ideals and international norms, all which impact the
everyday life of the individual. I am most interested in the spread of democracy and the extent to
which it is facilitated or hindered by the processes of globalization. It is important to explore this
relationship because it has implications for the quality of life of everyday individuals. Looking at
how level of democracy is affected by globalization can provide us with insights into how
organizations like the United Nations can work to harness different aspects of globalization to
promote the spread of democracy. This would perhaps advance efforts to afford individuals
living in non-democratic states the right to vote and more freedoms that come alongside
democracy. The study of the relationship between globalization and democracy thus has very
important implications for the spread of human rights and the improvement of the quality of life
of the global citizen, and therefore must be pursued.
This paper will begin with a brief overview of some of the scholarly work that has been
previously completed on this topic, and on topics related to it. Following this overview, I will
discuss my hypotheses and the theory behind these hypotheses. I will then move into a
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discussion of my variables and their operationalization. The crux of my research will be
presented in the analysis section, where I will present the results of my quantitative study.
Finally, I will discuss these results and their implications in the discussion and conclusion
sections of my paper.
~
The literature surrounding the study of the effects of globalization on level of democracy
seems to be rather robust, however, oftentimes it lacks specificity and focuses on different
mechanisms of democracy promotion than those I am interested in studying. My research aims to
focus on the spread of democracy through globalization and, more specifically, through norm
creation by way of participation in international organizations and through the development of
post-materialist ideas by way of increased material wealth as a benefit of globalization. These
two mechanisms have not been very widely studied, but the previous literature regarding this
relationship does offer interesting insights into whether or not globalization as a whole does
affect level of democracy. There is significant debate surrounding this relationship and the nature
of it: particularly whether the relationship is positive or negative. I will attempt to consolidate the
findings of these other researchers and show how this research project differs.

Economic Globalization and the Backlash Against It
Eichengreen and Leblang, who have completed extensive research on the relationship
between trade openness (as an aspect of globalization) and democracy, note that their
“…findings support the existence of positive relationships running in both directions between
democracy and globalization,” (Eichengreen and Leblang 2006, 319). They accomplished this
using data from 1870-2000. My study will be similar to this one in that it aims to show the effect
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of globalization on democracy, but I will be doing so using a wider scope in terms of
globalization and more recent data. Rather than just focusing on economic globalization as
expressed by trade openness, I will also be examining both economic and political globalization
as presented in the KOF Index of Globalization. My analysis will also be an important
contribution to existing work because it will serve as an update to what Eichengreen and Leblang
found 20 years ago.
One thematic focus in the study of the relationship between globalization and level of
democracy has been the rise of populism as a result of the backlash against globalization. What
is meant by backlash is largely organized discontent towards ruling institutions, parties, and
leaders that are seen as having played a role in the establishment of globalization as a world
order. This discontent has, as previously mentioned, manifested in the form of support for
populism and its leaders. Of this, Jeffry Frieden says, “Political discontent has been central to
the globalization backlash. Dissatisfaction has taken the form of large increases in voting for
extremist political parties…often in favor of “populists” of the Right or Left whose common
themes include skepticism about economic integration and resentment of ruling elites,” (Frieden
2017, 3). He goes on to use the examples of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the United
States, both of whom were able to garner substantial support by running on anti-establishment
platforms. This trend is not, however, limited to the United States. Across the world, we have
seen increased support for such parties including in countries such as France with the Front
National’s Marine Le Pen, and the current president of Tunisia, Kais Saied.
If this backlash is so widespread, what has caused such a phenomenon to occur to such an
extent? The causal factor can oftentimes be traced back to economics. Martin Sandbu
characterizes the drivers of this backlash as the “left behind”- that is, those “losers” of
5

globalization who witness the increasing wealth of the elites and who do not feel a similar levelor any level, at that- of prosperity. He points to a prior economic claim that is to blame for the
rise in illiberalism and nationalism. “This claim is that the economic opportunities have dried up,
and those that still exist have been closed off and reserved for an elite to which “normal people”
don’t belong,” (Sandbu 2020, 8). This can be contrasted with the period after WWII, when
populations of countries bore witness to an economic boom in which they were able to hold
positive views of the future, and largely held the belief that their children would grow up to be
better off than them.
Following the oil crisis in 1973 and with the onset of the era of hyperglobalization, many
people no longer hold this belief and instead perceive themselves as the “left behind”- those that
did not reap the benefits of globalization. Sandbu points to the “elephant chart” (pictured below)
to characterize the left behind.

This chart graphs how each percentile of global income distribution fared over the last two
decades by looking at the percentage income growth. Looking at the low base of the elephant’s
trunk, we can see that those individuals in the eightieth to ninetieth percentile of the world
6

income distribution did not see the vast income growth that both lower percentiles and the
wealthiest saw in these two decades. The eightieth to ninetieth percentile is where we can locate
“the bottom half of the old Industrialized West- [who] saw the fruits of globalization pass them
by,” (Sandbu 2020, 20). This graph is incredibly important in understanding who globalization’s
discontents are.
Milner adds to this body of research in her article titled Globalization and its Political
Consequences: The Effects of Party Politics in the West. What she finds in this article is that
“…a direct relationship appears to exist between globalization and changes in party platforms.
More trade and FDI are associated with a turn to anti-internationalism and anti-globalization, but
less so for broader populist sentiments,” (Milner 2018, 40). What is interesting about Milner’s
work is that she focuses on 23 OECD between 1970 and 2016. This sample represents the
experiences of developed countries in the West, which is helpful for examining the long-term
effects of globalization on countries in which there is generally less economic insecurity. In my
paper, I will be investigating the relationship between globalization and level of democracy
throughout 182 countries over a similar time period. With this model, I will be able to get a
clearer picture of the relationship as it exists across the international system, looking at both
developed and developing countries.
This body of research studying the effects of the globalization backlash is important in
developing our understanding of the mechanisms by which globalization affects level of
democracy within a country. However, I argue that this trend is only really relevant in those
developed countries which have already seen the initial effects of globalization and have
experienced globalization to an extent at which the effects of globalization, mainly an increase in
material wealth, have been disproportionately felt at differing socio-economic levels. What
7

should also be of interest is looking at the initial effects that globalization has on a society- when
the effects of increasing economic opportunity are first felt, and before they become visibly
disproportionate.

Social Globalization and Democracy
Another thematic focus centers around the social aspect of globalization and, more
specifically, the effect that increased access to the Internet has on level of democracy. Roman
Gerodimos, in his article titled “Democracy and the Internet: Access, Engagement and
Deliberation,” argues that increased access to the internet (a sign of increased globalization of a
country) leads to increased social interactions, which then have a positive effect on civic
engagement. Of this, he says, “…social capital in the early stages of life leads to political
socialization, which in turn leads to civic engagement. Politically relevant social capital itself is
created through personal networks and social exchanges…In short, social interactions with other
individuals eventually lead to greater civic participation,” (Gerodimos 2006, 27). Greater civic
participation provides for a more robust democracy, as a successful democracy is one that is
founded upon the active participation of the people and rule by the people. This thematic focus
provides evidence for a positive relationship between globalization and democracy; however,
Gerodimos’s paper is largely based on qualitative studies, rather than quantitative ones. My
paper will attempt to quantitatively explore the relationship between globalization and level of
democracy.
A quantitative approach to this thematic focus is accomplished by Celin Carlo-Gonzalez,
Christopher McKallagat, and Jenifer Whitten-Woodring in their paper The Rainbow Effect:
Media Freedom, Internet Access, and Gay Rights. In this paper, they find that “All else being
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equal, we observe greater respect for gay rights in those countries featuring a combination of
both free media and higher rates of Internet access,” (Carlo-Gonzalez, McKallagat, and WhittenWoodring, 2017). This aligns with the theory that as level of globalization increases (evidenced
by increase in media freedom and internet access), and as economic opportunity increases with
it, a post-materialist society will develop. In a post-materialist society, tolerance of out-groups is
higher, which would lead to an increase in Gay rights. Because my measure of democracy is
based on variables like freedom of expression, I will be exploring economic and political aspects
of globalization and how they affect level of democracy, rather than focusing on aspects of social
globalization (such as internet access and press freedom). This is because freedom of expression
and internet access are both part of how the KOF globalization index measures social
globalization; as a result, I cannot explore the effects of one on the other, as they come from the
same measure.
A lot of the existing literature on this topic is important to examine when conceptualizing
the mechanism by which globalization has the capacity to affect the level of democracy within a
country. However, there does not appear to be sufficient literature on the economic and political
mechanisms through which globalization affects democracy. Those studies that do examine this
relationship tend to either be outdated, as is the case with Eichengreen and Leblang, focus on
other individual aspects of globalization like press freedom or internet access, as is the case with
Gerodimo and Carlo-Gonzalez, McKallagat, and Whitten-Woodring, or are concentrated on just
the effects of the backlash against globalization, as is the case with numerous authors including
Sandbu and Milner. Through my paper, I hope to provide a more up-to-date and comprehensive
look at the mechanisms through which globalization affects level of democracy. In the following
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section, I will discuss my theory and the mechanisms by which I believe globalization will affect
level of democracy within a country.

Theory
The guiding research question for this paper is “Does a country’s level of economic or
political globalization exercise an influence on its level of democracy?” I argue that through
various mechanisms that I analyze in the following paragraphs, economic and political
globalization work to increase the level of democracy present within a country- and particularly
the level of democracy present within developing countries. Through a quantitative exploration
of these variables, I expect to find that a positive relationship will exist between economic
globalization and level of democracy and that a positive relationship will also exist between
political globalization and democracy. As I discuss below, these positive relationships should be
facilitated through norm sharing that occurs with political globalization and through an increase
in material wealth that should occur with economic globalization. This is not to say that this
trend will be equally realized across all countries. In fact, I expect to find that the positive
relationship between economic globalization and level of democracy will perhaps be smaller in
magnitude due to the variety of ways in which this relationship is manifested in different states.
What is of particular importance in the undertaking of this research is to first define
democracy and globalization, two concepts that can be relatively ambiguous. For the purpose of
this paper, I define democracy as a government in which power is held by the people and is
manifested through free and fair elections. Some ideals traditionally associated with democracy
include freedom, separation of church and state, justice, equality, and tolerance. These are the
foundations of democracy to which I will be referring throughout this paper. This definition of
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democracy is best represented by the Electoral democracy index, provided by the Varieties of
Democracy Project. I will explain this variable further in my research design.
Globalization encompasses a wide variety of processes involving interactions among
states. As previously stated, and for the purpose of this paper, I define globalization as the
process of interaction and integration among the people, companies and governments of different
nations. It is a process driven by trade and investment and supported by economic partnerships
and institutions. What is also important to note about the concept of globalization is that it
produces discontented individuals who have contributed to the significant backlash against
globalization in recent years. These individuals are often concentrated in the developed West
where the effects of globalization are felt disproportionately at different socio-economic levels
largely due to a failure of compensation. These “losers” of globalization are quick to blame
globalization itself for their hardships, which has often resulted in an increase in support for
right-wing populists who espouse nationalistic sentiments in efforts to appeal to opponents of
globalization. Other critics of globalization point to the rising inequality between countries as a
reason to fight against it. The goal of this paper is to hopefully show that globalization itself is
not the reason there is increasing inequality within countries and across countries. Rather, the
reason for this is likely because of other factors- a lack of effort to compensate the losers of
globalization and to provide the tools with which individuals and developing countries can
become competitive in a global market.
Through this paper, I will be exploring the effect that globalization has on level of
democracy. I believe that globalization will have a positive effect on level of globalization
primarily through two mechanisms- one economic, and one political.
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The first mechanism that I propose is an economic one. Previous studies have found that
globalization seems to have a positive effect on economic development, in most cases. Dominick
Salvatore finds that globalization, when taken advantage of, generally has positive effects on the
economic growth of a state. He quantitatively looks at the relationship between globalization and
growth. Through this study, he finds that, “…the growth of real per capita (PPP) GDP increased
sharply in each decade from 1960 to 2010 for the developing countries that globalized (i.e., those
for which the ratio of international trade and international financial flows to GDP increased) and
far exceeded the average growth of rich countries and that of the non-globalizers,”(Salvatore,
2012, 7). This is promising evidence that globalization is able to have a positive effect on
developing countries, a relationship that has often been called in to question as the poorest
countries still find themselves unable to develop.
“For those firms and nations that do take advantage of this trend [towards globalization],
the results are increased efficiency, greater international competitiveness, and more rapid
growth,” (Salvatore 2012, 3). The problem, he argues, lies in those countries where a large
portion of the population is too poor to be able to capitalize on globalization and open the
economy up. If these countries were able to mobilize and open up their economies to the rest of
the world, their average citizen, if the trend holds, would increase their income, and eventually
be lifted out of poverty. Once lifted out of poverty, these individuals will be better able to benefit
from globalization through participation in the global economy by perhaps creating businesses or
pursuing an education that would lead them to a more lucrative job.
This positive relationship between globalization and economic development is important
to underscore, particularly with the growing anti-globalization sentiment across the world. What
we learn from Salvatore’s research is that globalization has the potential to encourage economic
12

development within a country- as long as that country has the minimum capability to capitalize
on what globalization has to offer. This, of course may be contingent on a number of different
factors, including state capacity. It is important to note here that neoliberal policies- which are all
too often encouraged by the West- often have the effect of eroding state capacity. This suggests
it may be in the international system’s best interests to move away from neoliberal policies.
This relationship is important in a second way that more closely relates to this paper, as
well. As Salvatore demonstrates, when a country is able to partake in globalization, its economy
is able to further develop, and thus there is an increase in material wealth of its citizens. This
increase in material wealth has important implications for the level of democracy present within
a country. As Inglehart and Norris argue in their article titled, Trump and the Populist
Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse, as societies move past their materialist
stage and enter into the post-materialist stage in which basic needs are met, the society begins to
emphasize the post-materialist values of freedom of expression, gender equality, tolerance of
gays, handicapped people, and foreigners. They argue that “When (security) can be taken for
granted, it opens the way for new norms concerning everything from economic behavior to
sexual orientation and the spread of democratic institutions,” (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 443).
This is another reason I would expect higher levels of globalization to lead to an increased level
of democracy; the increase in material wealth that comes with globalization encourages an
emphasis on democratic values like freedom of expression, tolerance, and representation.
With this theory in mind, I have developed the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Countries with higher levels of economic globalization will have
higher levels of democracy.
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The second mechanism through which I propose globalization affects the level of
democracy within a country is political. When a country opens up to globalization, they also
open themselves up to foreign influence which is manifested through the presence of nongovernmental organizations within the country, participation in international organizations, and
establishment of foreign embassies within the country. These factors are all included in the KOF
political globalization measure which I use to conduct my empirical tests of my hypotheses.
The opening up to foreign influence through globalization can help to facilitate the spread
of international norms. As democracy becomes a more important international norm, at least as
espoused by the West, I expect to see that higher levels of political globalization will be
associated with higher levels of democracy. One example of this can be seen in the process by
which a country accedes to the European Union. According to the Copenhagen Criteria, in order
to become a member, the state in question must be a democracy and have a demonstrated
commitment to uphold human rights. Currently, Turkey is engaging in a bid for accession to the
EU. Due to their storied history of human rights abuses against the Kurds, suppression of free
speech and press, and various other aspects, Turkey has yet to accede to the EU. However,
because of the economic prowess of the EU and the establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria,
Turkey has an incentive to improve its human rights record in order to accede. This is just one
example of how international organizations can influence the domestic policies of a state.
The United Nations, through its many resolutions and conferences, facilitates norm
creation by establishing international expectations that states are then held to. Failure to abide by
these expectations can result in sanctions or condemnations by other member states, which can
have detrimental effects to the development of the country in question. The United Nations lists
democracy as one of their core principals and has many initiatives to support democracy
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promotion around the world- one of these being the supervision of elections. Membership and
participation in IOs like the United Nations should therefore expose these states to international
norms like democracy and encourage them to develop these norms domestically through the use
of soft power on the part of other member states.
The existence of NGOs within a country should also help to facilitate a move towards
higher levels of democracy. The United States State Department has historically been quite
active in supporting NGOs in developing countries because of their ability to promote
democracy within these states. In his 2006 remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, spoke on
the crucial role that NGOs play in the development of democracy. He observed,
“Today, all across the globe, NGOs are helping to establish and strengthen democracy in three key ways:
•

First, NGOs are working to establish awareness of and respect for the right of individuals to exercise
freedoms of expression, assembly and association, which is crucial to participatory democracy.

•

Second, NGOs are working to ensure that there is a level playing field upon which candidates for
elective office can compete and that the entire elections process is free and fair.

•

Third, NGOs are working to build and strengthen the rule of just laws and responsive and accountable
institutions of government so that the rights of individuals are protected regardless of which persons or
parties may be in office at any given time.” (Lowenkron, 2006).

Political globalization can also lead to an increased level of democracy in a much less
formal way through the work done by non-governmental organizations.
With this theory in mind, I have developed this second, and final hypothesis to guide my
quantitative research:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with higher levels of political globalization should have higher
levels of democracy.
15

Through my quantitative analysis of the relationships between political globalization and
level of democracy and between economic globalization and level of democracy, I expect to find
that both exhibit a positive relationship. I now turn to my research design.

Research Design
I employ a time-series-cross-section data set. The data set covers the time period 19702014. Through this project, I hope to identify trends between globalization and democracy across
the globe, and therefore have included every country for which there is data concerning the
variables in which I am interested. With these variables, I will be looking at data from 182
countries. As I will be looking at each country in my sample per year, the unit of analysis for this
paper is the country-year. The variables and data that I am looking at come from the Quality of
Government (QOG) dataset.
Dependent Variable:
My dependent variable for this paper is level of democracy. Although there are quite a
few measures representing level of democracy within a country, I chose the Electoral democracy
index, coded as vdem_polyarchy, and collected by the Varieties of Democracy Project. This will
allow me to look at the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy has been achieved in the
182 countries present in my sample. The characteristics of a democracy present within this
variable most closely resemble the concept of democracy I am interested in exploring, which, as
previously mentioned, includes some ideals traditionally associated with democracy like
freedom, free and fair elections, justice, equality, and tolerance. This variable in particular,
according to the QOG dataset, “…is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum
of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick), suffrage, clean elections, elected
executive (de jure) and freedom of expression; and, on the other, the five-way interaction
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between those indices,” (Dahlberg, 2019, 143).The freedom of expression measure included
within this variable is of particular interest to me, as I believe that this is an important feature of
democracy, especially when investigating the effects of both political and economic
globalization on level of democracy. This variable is operationalized at the interval level with
values ranging from 0 to 1.
Central Explanatory Variables:
The first of my central explanatory variables is Economic Globalization, which is coded
as dr_eg. This variable comes from the KOF Index of Globalization and is reported at the
interval level with possible score ranging from 1 to 100. A score of one would indicate the
lowest level of economic globalization possible, and a score of 100 would indicate the highest
level of economic globalization possible. Economic Globalization is operationalized through an
aggregation of trade globalization de facto, trade globalization de jure, financial globalization de
facto, and financial globalization de jure. These measures include things like trade in goods and
services, trade regulations, taxes, and agreements, foreign direct investment, international debt,
investment restrictions, capital account openness, etc. By combining all of these statistics about a
state, the KOF Globalization index is able to produce a rather well-rounded measure of economic
globalization, which will allow me to examine the effect economic globalization has on level of
democracy within a country.
My second central explanatory variable is political globalization. This variable also
comes from the KOF Index of Globalization and is reported in the same way: at the interval level
with possible scores ranging from 1 to 100. It is operationalized through an aggregation of
political globalization de facto (measured through number of embassies, UN peace keeping
missions and international NGOs) and political globalization de jure (measured through number
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of international organizations of which the state is a member, international treaties signed, and
treaty partner diversity). I believe this measure presents an effective way of operationalizing
political globalization, which I expect to affect levels of democracy through norm sharing.
Control Variables
In my statistical model, I use several control variables in order to account for possible
other explanations for the effect that globalization has on level of democracy. The first of these is
ethnic fractionalization, which is coded as al_ethnic. I suspect that in states that have lower
levels of ethnic fractionalization, there will be higher levels of democracy, as homogeneity and
lack of civil unrest promote democracy. As Benjamin Reilly summarizes, “Scholars have
traditionally believed that internal ethnic divisions are detrimental to democratic stability,”
(Reilly 2000, 164).
The next control variable is 2010 GDP per capita, which is coded as
wdi_gdpcapcon2010. This variable reports GDP per capita at the interval level, with possible
values ranging from 0 to infinity. This control will help account for the effect that material
wealth has on the level of democracy within a society. If there are high levels of material wealth,
it is likely that the society will exhibit more post-material values like tolerance and freedom of
expression (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 443) which could then affect the level of democracy
within the state.
My third control variable is population size, which is coded as wdi_pop. This variable
reports population size at the interval level with possible values ranging from zero to infinity.
What I expect to find is that with a higher population size, there will be a lower level of
democracy because the costs of running a democracy (and free and fair elections) increase. I
suspect this to be the case because this is what we see in India. “Indian law says no one should
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have to travel more than 2 kilometers (about 1.25 miles) to vote. So poll workers… trek through
the jungle to bring voting machines to a man who lives alone in a lion-infested forest in the
western state of Gujarat… (Frayer and Khan, 2019). This anecdote serves to remind us of the
costs of running a democracy, which theoretically should only increase with a larger population.
My final control variable is Oil Production Value in 2014 dollars, which is coded as
(ross_oil_value_2014). I expect to find that with higher levels of oil production, we will find
lower levels of democracy. Kevin Tsui found that, “…on average, discovering 100 billion barrels
pushes a country’s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below the existing trend,” (Tsui
2010, 111). He suspects that this is due to the natural resource curse which dictates that countries
with high levels of natural resources will exhibit low levels of democracy.
Methodology
Because my dependent variable is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1,
I will be using an OLS regression statistical test for my analysis. This statistical test allows me to
measure the effect of my central explanatory variables on my dependent variable. It also allows
me to test the null hypothesis that the observed relationship occurred by chance, and produces a
PRE measure of association between the central explanatory variable and the dependent variable.
By running a multiple regression, I will be able to employ my control variables to look at the
effect of each explanatory variable on level of democracy while taking in to account the effect of
my control variables upon my dependent variable.

Analysis
Completion of my OLS regression model in stata to test my two hypotheses provided me
with the following output tables.
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Table 1. Effects of Economic Globalization on Electoral Democracy Index, 1970-2014
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Deviation

Economic Globalization

0.005***

(0.000)

GDP per capita

0.000***

(0.000)

Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.211***

(0.012)

Population Size

0.000***

(0.000)

Oil Production Value

-0.000***

(0.000)

N
R2

5,820
0.3582

Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: * p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001

Table 2. Effects of Political Globalization on Electoral Democracy Index, 1970-2014
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Deviation

Political Globalization

0.006***

(0.000)

GDP per capita

0.000***

(0.000)

Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.189***

(0.012)

Population Size

-0.000***

(0.000)

Oil Production Value

-0.000***

(0.000)

N
R2

5,930
0.4643

Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: * p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
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Let us first examine Table 1, which shows us the effects of economic globalization on
electoral democracy index from 1970 to 2014. In my theory section, I hypothesized that
economic globalization would have a positive effect on electoral democracy index. This
hypothesis proved to be supported by my empirical test. The regression model for economic
globalization produced a coefficient of 0.005, which tells us that for each 1-point increase in
economic globalization, we find a 0.005-point increase in the electoral democracy index. This
relationship is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.000.
In this multiple regression, I also tested the relationship between Electoral Democracy
Index and my control variables. What is first interesting to note is that the R2 for this multiple
regression was reported at .3582. This means that my independent variable and controls account
for 35.82% of the variation in Electoral Democracy Index, which is admittedly a rather large
portion of the variation.
GDP per capita and population size both had a positive coefficient, but the coefficients
reported for these controls was less than 0.000. These tests were also statistically significant,
with a p-value of less than 0.000. The positive relationship seen between GDP per capita and
Electoral Democracy Index confirms my hypothesis; however, the positive relationship seen
between population size and Electoral Democracy Index is the opposite of what I hypothesized.
Oil production value reported a negative coefficient, meaning that with higher levels of
oil production value, there are lower levels of democracy. This relationship is statistically
significant with a p-value of less than 0.000. This is in keeping with the resource curse theory,
and my previously stated hypothesis, however, the coefficient had a value of less than 0.000,
meaning that its effect on Electoral Democracy index is rather small.
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The control variable with the largest coefficient was Ethnic Fractionalization, which
reported a coefficient of -0.211. This means that for each 1-point increase in Ethnic
Fractionalization, we see a 0.211-point decrease in Electoral Democracy. This relationship was
statistically significant, with a p-value of less than 0.000.
The summary statistics for this regression can be found in Table 3, which is located in the
appendix.
Let us now turn to Table 2, which demonstrates the effects of political globalization on
electoral democracy index. In this table, we see that the regression model for political
globalization produced a positive coefficient of 0.006. This means that for every 1-point increase
in political globalization, we see a .0006-point increase in electoral democracy index. This
coefficient is positive, which confirms my hypothesis, and has slightly more magnitude than that
of economic globalization. However, the coefficients for both economic and political
globalization are still rather small. This relationship is statistically significant with a p-value of
less than 0.000.
I ran this multiple regression with the same controls as the regression for economic
globalization. The R2 for this regression was reported as 0.4643. This means that this
combination of independent variable and controls accounts for 46.43% of the variation found in
Electoral Democracy Index, which is quite a significant amount. It is interesting to note as well
that this R2 is .1061 larger than the R2 value reported with economic globalization as the
independent variable. Another difference one should note between these two tables is the sample
size. In Table 1, there is a sample size of 5,820, and in Table 2, there is a sample size of 5,930.
This increase of 110 units of analysis seems to have caused some variation in the results, which I
will discuss in the coming paragraphs.
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GDP per capita and oil production value exhibited the same results as they did when run
with economic globalization. As such, their coefficients align with my hypotheses, and they
remain statistically significant with p-values of less than 0.000.
With the larger sample size of this regression, the coefficient of population size changed
from positive to negative. This negative coefficient confirms my hypothesis; however, the
coefficient remains 0.000, which means that population size still has an extremely small effect on
electoral democracy index. This relationship has a p-value of less than 0.000, meaning it is
statistically significant.
Finally, ethnic fractionalization exhibited the largest coefficient, and thus the largest
effect on electoral democracy index with a coefficient of -0.189. This is still in keeping with my
previously states hypothesis. I suspect that this difference in value is due to the increase in
sample size for this regression. Since this sample size was larger than the that of economic
globalization, I suspect that perhaps with more units, the coefficient will decrease in magnitude
further. This relationship remains statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.000.
In efforts to judge the robustness of this relationship, I also ran a regression with a
different measure of democracy, the Participatory democracy index, which is coded as
vdem_partipdem. This measure emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political
processes, electoral and non-electoral. This variable comes from the same data set as my
dependent variable, Electoral democracy index, and is thus operationalized in the same way. It is
operationalized at the interval level with possible scores ranging from 0 to 1.
Running this robustness measure produced the following results:
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Table 5. Effects of Economic Globalization on Participatory Democracy Index, 1970-2014
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Deviation

Economic Globalization

0.004***

(0.000)

GDP per capita

0.000***

(0.000)

Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.164***

(0.009)

Population Size

0.000***

(0.000)

Oil Production Value

-0.000***

(0.000)

N
R2

5,820
0.4027

Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: * p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001

Table 5. Effects of Political Globalization on Participatory Democracy Index, 1970-2014
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Deviation

Political Globalization

0.005***

(0.000)

GDP per capita

0.000***

(0.000)

Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.143***

(0.008)

Population Size

0.000***

(0.000)

Oil Production Value

-0.000***

(0.000)

N
R2

5,930
0.5226

Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: * p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001
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By looking at the p-values, we can determine that the relationship between both
economic and political globalization and level of democracy remains statistically significant,
even when using a different measure of democracy. The same holds for the controls under both
political and economic globalization, as every p-value reported had a value of less than .000. I
have included the above tables because the results of the regressions are interesting to note, but
as this paper does not aim to discuss the effects of globalization on participatory democracy, and
for purposes of brevity, I will not be discussing the results further.

Discussion
The analysis completed through this paper produced a quantitative study of the
relationship between political globalization and Electoral democracy index, as well as into the
relationship between economic globalization and Electoral democracy index. In the theory
section of this paper, I predicted that both economic and political globalization would have a
positive relationship with level of democracy. These hypotheses were confirmed through my
regression analyses, which produced a positive coefficient of 0.005 for economic globalization
and a positive coefficient of 0.006 for political globalization. To reiterate, this means that for
each point a country moves up on economic globalization, the electoral democracy index for that
country will move up 0.005 points. For each one-point movement up on political globalization,
the country will move up .006 points.
Although my hypotheses were supported, I was hoping that both coefficients would have
a higher magnitude in order to provide more evidence in defense of globalization. What is
encouraging, however, is that both coefficients were positive. As previously mentioned, many
are often quick to decry globalization as the harbinger of economic inequality and destroyer of
democracy. What this study tells us is that, however marginally, both political and economic
25

globalization do have a positive effect on the level of democracy within a country. This is not to
say that globalization offers zero consequences to those states that welcome it— in fact, I would
suspect that some of these “consequences” of globalization are to blame for the smaller
magnitude of these coefficients- that is, in an indirect way. Allow me to elaborate in the coming
paragraphs.
As previously mentioned, Martin Sandbu points to the “elephant chart” (pictured above
on page 5) to characterize the “left behind”- those who have been passed up by the fruits of
globalization. To reiterate: this chart graphs how each percentile of global income distribution
fared over the last two decades by looking at the percentage income growth. Looking at the low
base of the elephant’s trunk, we can see that those individuals in the eightieth to ninetieth
percentile of the world income distribution did not see the vast income growth that both lower
percentiles and the wealthiest saw in these two decades. The eightieth to ninetieth percentile is
where we can locate “the bottom half of the old Industrialized West- [who] saw the fruits of
globalization pass them by,” (Sandbu 2020, 20).
What Sandbu emphasizes in the following pages and chapters of his book is what the
elephant chart does not show us: a causal relationship between globalization and the lack of
income growth amongst the Western lower middle class. What is all too common to do amongst
populists is to falsely claim that the reason for this lack of income growth is globalization. Too
often, globalization is used as a scapegoat for the woes of this demographic and it is this
scapegoating that has led to a rise in support for populists- who promise to quell these woes by
“draining the swamp” and closing borders to keep out those in the lower percentiles of global
income distribution who are said to have stolen the economic opportunities owed to the lower
middle class.

26

If globalization is not the cause of these woes, we must look to alternative explanations.
Jeffry Frieden offers two: failures of compensation and failures of representation. He argues that
“… a globalization backlash is likely to be mitigated by compensation mechanisms; and the
absence of adequate compensation is likely to feed a globalization backlash,” (Freiden 2017, 14).
The basic principle behind this is that with every economic policy that is implemented, there are
bound to be individuals who are harmed by the policy. Those harmed by the policy can be
compensated through reallocation of income from those who benefit from the policy. What has
produced such a forceful globalization backlash, according to Frieden, is the lack of a
compensatory scheme in place to mitigate the losses of the losers. The second reason for which
we have seen a backlash to globalization, according to Freiden, is that there has been a
disconnect between what voters want and the policies put forth by the parties and candidates
running for office. “Traditional, mainstream political parties and politicians have not brought
many of the concerns of these voters prominently enough onto the political agenda,” (Frieden
2017, 19).
I suspect that these failures of compensation and representation- which are often
perceived as consequences of globalization- are partially responsible for the small magnitudes of
the coefficients of political and economic globalization produced in my regression models- at
least amongst the developed countries of the West in which these failures are particularly
prominent. These failures have produced significant economic inequalities, which have
contributed in part to the rise of populism.
The backlash against globalization has several implications for the future. For one, we
have seen the rise of right-wing populists throughout many Western democracies. Because their
policies favor nationalism, what we could see in the near future is a push towards
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deglobalization. The coronavirus pandemic further complicates this. What we have learned thus
far from the pandemic is that in a hyperglobalized world, states are often unprepared for a crisis
that forces them to confront issues on their own. In a crisis like the pandemic, states tend to close
themselves off from the rest of the world in hopes of preserving themselves and what few
resources they have readily available. This is not a sustainable trend. Many scholars are now
calling for the rethinking of globalization. Farrell and Newman call for us to “build something
better… a system that mitigates the risks of economic and political dependency and supports a
new vision of global society,” (Farrell and Newman, 2020). Rebuilding globalization in this way
would certainly help to mitigate some of the losses of the left behind, perhaps through
compensation mechanisms. However, we must keep in mind that the backlash against
globalization has resulted in the rise of right-wing populist parties that favor nationalism and, in
the case of the United States, a small welfare state. These two desires of right-wing populists fall
in direct opposition to what Farrell and Newman argue for. In the future, it is easy to foresee a
clash between what disillusioned, left-behind voters want, and what would actually work to quell
their woes. This will likely prove to have dangerous implications for level of democracy,
particularly within the developed states where this tends to be a problem.
Although both political and economic globalization both had rather small coefficients,
one control variable, ethnic fractionalization, seemed to have a rather significant effect on
Electoral democracy index. This suggests that what matters most in determining level of
democracy within a country is perhaps domestic factors, rather than foreign influence through
globalization. This would make sense given that domestic factors tend to have the most
immediate effect on the political atmosphere of a society, while the mechanisms through which
globalization might affect level of democracy tend to utilize soft power, particularly with
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political globalization. This would also make sense in the context of Frieden’s failures of
compensation being to blame for the discontent surrounding globalization. That which is
experienced on the ground in a given state affects political leanings, and in the case of the rise of
right-wing populism, level of democracy within the state.

Conclusion
What this research tells us is that, however marginal, both political and economic
globalization have a positive effect on Electoral democracy index within a country. This means
that as political and economic globalization increase within a state, so does that state’s level of
democracy. This has important implications for the future because it helps to undermine the antiglobalization discourse that is so often advanced by conservatives and right-wing populists.
This research shows us a trend that emerges when we look at 182 countries across the
globe. It would be particularly interesting and perhaps enlightening to run two similar regression
models but broken down by region or level of development. I suspect that different trends would
emerge when examining the relationship between globalization and level of democracy from this
perspective. For example, I would suspect that in extremely underdeveloped nations that do not
yet have the infrastructure to properly benefit from globalization (countries like Chad), we would
see both economic and political globalization having an even smaller effect on level of
democracy within a country. In developed Western nations like the United States and the United
Kingdom, I would not be surprised to see negative relationship reported between globalization
and level of democracy as anti-immigrant rhetoric, anti-globalization rhetoric, and right-wing
populism abound. In those developing nations that are well on their way to development, I would
suspect that the positive relationship seen in my regressions might grow in magnitude. If a study
like this were to be run, it would provide an interesting framework for how states at varying
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levels of development could best capitalize on the fruits of globalization while working to limit
the failures of compensation that might arise.
Because globalization is shown in this study to have a positive effect overall on level of
democracy, I believe it is important that this research be taken further in order to find ways in
which democracy promotion can be more properly tailored to each nation. This would allow a
greater number of individuals around the world enjoy a greater number of freedoms which is, of
course, an important aspiration towards which we must strive.
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Appendix:
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Electoral Democracy
Index

9,788

.4275245

.2887244

.0081353

.9399808

Economic
Globalization

7,340

49.65648

16.89475

10.21933

93.72647

GDP per capita

8,173

10308.74

15716.11

115.7941

144,246.4

Ethnic
Fractionalization

13,348

.4393782

.2558751

0

.930175

Population Size

9,441

3.03e+07

1.15e+08

6237

1.39e+09

Oil Production Value

8,821

6.84e+09

2.84e+10

0

4.68e+11

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Electoral Democracy
Index

5,930

.4725768

.2904656

.0127043

.9399808

Political
Globalization

5,930

58.81039

21.35085

6.231401

99.54428

GDP per capita

5,930

10510.88

16126.46

115.7941

113,682

Ethnic
Fractionalization

5,930

.4584421

.2589187

0

.930175

Population Size

5,930

3.77e+07

1.32e+08

244539

1.36e+09

Oil Production Value

5,930

8.47e+09

3.08e+10

0

4.18e+11
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